Some Equivalence between Muslim and Jewish ruled societies? Torah prohibition of Jewish presence in Egypt

I was delighted to find a passage, in a Jewish religious text, that shows appreciation for Muslims and Islam. A respected commentator on the Torah suggests, that in one matter of Jewish law, a society ruled by a Muslim king would have equal status to one ruled by a Jewish king.

This teaching was a wonderful find for me, because I live between two worlds. One is the exclusivist Orthodox Jewish one; the other is one that embraces, and even celebrates, a wide range of beliefs and cultural ways. So when these two meet, it gives me great pleasure.

I had better preempt two kinds of fierce critiques, based on inferences that either Jewish and Islamic faiths are equally true or an endorsement of every aspect of Islam. This text should not be read as either relinquishing exclusive Truth claims for the Jewish faith or wholesale endorsement of Islam, neither of which it is addressing at all; it has a particular context.

However, the teaching does reflect a recognition of the fact that some of the virtues Jews strive for due to the influences of Judaism are also practiced by Muslims due to influences of Islam. Of course this is also the case with people with other sources of guidance, both religious and otherwise. 

With the disclaimers out of the way, let me get into this teaching. There is a contradiction between the fact that Jewish communities and some of our greatest scholars, most notably Maimonides, lived in Egypt, yet the Torah forbids Jews to live there (1).

The context of the prohibition is a series of laws to prevent kings from becoming corrupt, with the hope that the king’s “heart should not be haughty over his brothers” (2). These laws limit the amount of wealth and horses a king can accumulate. It then adds the following statement: "so that he [the king] will not bring the people back to Egypt in order to acquire many horses.(3)".

I was intrigued to read one authority declare that this commandment only applied for a limited time so that the Jews would not learn immoral behavior from the Egyptians, but did not apply for future generations (4). The line of argument that the prohibition has expired is extended in the writings of an early nineteenth century scholar, Rabbi Meir Benyamin Menachem Danon, who was the chief rabbi of Sarajevo in Muslim, Bosnia (5).

Danon argues that the conquest of Egypt by Muslims is a game changer. “When the king of the Ishmaelites [a reference to Arabs as well as Muslims] conquered the land of Egypt and all its inhabitants he turned them toward their religion [of Islam] and manners/cultural norms. With the passage of time, the Egyptians ...became like the Ishamaelites ...” (6). I wonder how Coptic Chrisitans would feel about this teaching, but let’s take Danon in his Bosnian Context. 

Danon’s basis for his argument is in the writing of Maimonides who states that: "it seems to me, that if the land of Egypt were to be conquered by a Jewish king under the guidance of a Beth Din, [a Torah court], the prohibition would no longer apply” (7). Danon essentially argued that it doesn't matter what kind of monotheistic society Egypt would be. He wrote that Maimonides’ reference to a Beth Din is merely descriptive of the typical scenario of a Jewish king going to war, rather than a condition for the law.

One might dismiss Danon’s argument based on the fact that Maimonides ruled that living in Egypt was still forbidden and only tentatively suggests it might be permitted under a Jewish king. If Danon’s view is in accordance with Maimonides’ own view why does Maimonides not state this explicitly? In fact, Maimonides use of the expression “it seems to me” is questioned by two scholars (8) who wonder why he does not simply present his view as law.

I suggest that this tentativeness might offer a hint to Maimonides’ real opinion on the matter. The fact that he was living in Egypt meant that he was personally implicated by this particular law, if he was in breach of it. In fact, it has been claimed that Maimonides would sign his letters, "Moshe ben Maimon, who transgresses three prohibitions each day" on account of his residence in Egypt (9). He could hardly feel comfortable justifying himself, in a novel way. We are taught that “one should not be defensive, in accordance with the proverb that one cannot recognise one’s own faults”, instead one should seek to judge oneself truthfully (10). This ethical principle might explain both Maimonides reticence in justifying living in Egypt under Muslim rule and the tentative language he uses to introduce the monotheistic conquest exception.

Danon’s teaching illustrates a manner of respect between believers that is not merely relativist. Rather, it acknowledges the reality that in some significant ways the religious influences of other faiths on their adherents can lead them to similar outcomes to those achieved through the influence of one’s own faith. There is no need to agree about the big questions of how to get to heaven or please the creator, but for the sake of truth let us recognise the truth about our neighbours, whose beliefs differ from our own, including the non-religious. Surely, this is in keeping with the idea that the Torah’s ways are ways of peace (11).

  

Notes 

1)            Deuteronomy 17:16

2)            Deuteronomy 17:20

3)            Deuteronomy 17:16

4)            Bachaya, on Deuteronomy 17:16, Ritva to Yoma 38 also takes the law to be non-applicable to his time but his reason is that the prohibition only applies to returning to Egypt from Israel, but moving there from other diaspora lands is permitted. This view seemed to contradict both the Jerusalem Talmud, Sukkah 5:1 and Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 51b which state that the massive Jewish community of Alexandria was destroyed because they disobeyed the commandment against settling in Egypt. Maimonides, Laws of Kings 5:8 rules that living permanently in Egypt is forbidden.

5)            http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/4891-danon-meir-benjamin-menahem chief rabbi of Sarajevo in Bosnia, author of "Be'er ba-Sadeh".

6)            Be'er ba-Sadeh, on this verse,  published in Jerusalem in 1846

7)            Maimonides, Laws of Kings 5:8

8)            Torah Temima, Levin, A. in Hadrash VeHaiyun, Shoftim, Maamar 125, p. 150 ff.

9)            Rabbi Ishtori Haparchi (1280-1366), in his encyclopedic work Kaftor v'Ferah, (ch. 5), cited in  Loewenberg, M. May a Jew live in Egypt?,   http://www.jewishmag.com/173mag/jew_live_in_egypt/jew_live_in_egypt.htm

10)          Chida in Nachal K’domim, in Torat Hachida, shoftim, p. 129

11)          Proverbs 3:17

Enemies

Tyrant Turned to Toy  by Divine Power

When I first started out as a Rabbi, I did a lesson for young adults in which I talked about the greatness of God expressed in punishment of the wicked. A participant challenged me; why would we aspire to that instead of just wishing for peace for all. Good point, I thought.


Since then, I have been moved by the way some Christians seek to love their enemies. I see that idea as radical, visionary and subversive; not accepting the dynamic of conflict and hate but rather insisting on a spiritual approach grounded in love. This is not a comparison between Judaism and Christianity or their histories, I am well aware of the blood shed by Christian crusaders. I also think the fact that Jews were powerless for 2000 years is a factor. This is an honest exploration of my own tradition and familiar stories to discover ideas about the response to enemies I had not noticed before. I have discovered some legalistic elements, but most exciting was a radical and subversive aspect to what could seem to be callous harshness.

Playing with enemies?!

According to one traditional translation[1], we have a seemingly scary idea about enemies. God tells Moses that in the future, “you will tell into the ears of your son and your son's son how I played with the Egyptians[2]”. Putting aside other translations that reject the meaning of “played with” instead rendering the Hebrew word הִתְעַלַּלְתִּי, as “my actions[3]”, can it be right that God has fun punishing people?! A sloppy translation of another verse would seem to support this idea, “just as the Lord rejoiced over you to do good for you and to increase you, so will the Lord rejoice over you to annihilate you and to destroy you[4]”.  The Talmud argues convincingly that the meaning here is not that God will rejoice over annihilation but rather will cause others to rejoice[5] in the destruction of the Jews. The Talmud categorically states that God does not rejoice in the downfall of the wicked[6].

Non-Fun-Play

The meaning of God’s play with the Egyptian tyrants is about subversion of power rather than fun. The verse about Kings and Nation, “He Who dwells in Heaven laughs; the Lord mocks them[7]”, is explained as “a metaphor for mockery about something that is not considered anything[8]”. The tyrants with their exaggerated self-importance and trappings of power can seem invincible. Yet, the Jew, threatened, beaten, ridiculed and humiliated can take comfort that the Pharaoh in his/her own day may yet prove to be a plaything of God, like Saddam or Muammar in our recent times.

Funny Honda Boss

Here is a personal anecdote that is an illustration of the subversive power of humour.
As a Yeshiva student, I was sitting in the library late one night with a book while some of my fellow student has broken the lock to the kitchen and were frying shnitzels when they should have been in bed. The head of the Yeshiva, a bit of an absent-minded professor type, came screaming up the street in his orange Honda, vrrroommmrrmrmm.  He throws the door open to the building and screams at the top of his lungs, “Ahh Chutzpehhhhh!” All the guilty young scholars are by now safely in their beds, their lights out, while the Shnitzels continue to fry as if being cooked by ghosts. The authority figure- my Yeshiva head, runs up and down the stairs through the building like a ball in one of those old pinball machines. He finds no one, until he discovers me in the library. He gave me what sounded like a very harsh long angry lecture about how I was destroying the whole school. I put on a very sad puppy-dog face, nodded my head and was not in the least bit offended by the whole comic spectacle.

Does punishment upset God?

The mystics state that when we talk of divine emotions, these are not to be understood in human terms[9] at all and are essentially metaphoric. In this vain, one commentator understands the verse relating to rejoicing about the destruction of the Jewish people as being a message that one should not  “think that God will be harmed, or will mourn” if he must punish us[10]. This is linked to the verse “If you are righteous, what do you give Him? Or what does He take from your hand?[11]”

Other sources suggest that God does care about the suffering of the wicked. In introducing the story of the splitting of the red sea[12], in which the Israelites were saved while the Egyptians perished, the word Vayehi  וַיְהִי (literally “and it was”, but linked to vai, or oy vay) is used which traditionally is used in situations of pain and sadness. This is attributed at least in part to the death of the Egyptians[13]. We are told that the angels wanted to sing praises to God for the miracles at the red sea. God exclaims, “the work of my hands are drowning in the sea and you will sing praises?![14]” Even, this is not simple, in another version of the same story God objects because he wants  the angels to wait until after the Israelites sing of their own salvation before the angels get their turn[15], but does not object to the singing itself at a time of great human suffering.  Yet, the view is better known among Jews is not the one in which God is concerned with the sequence of the praises, but his rejection of the content of the angels praise because of his care about the destruction of the wicked. This view is also reflected in at least one meaning behind the ritual of pouring out drops of wine at the Passover Seder in sympathy for the suffering of the Egyptians[16].

Other less pleasant approaches – all out war and legalism

It might make sense to stop while I am ahead, yet I think it would not be completely honest. Jewish responses to enemies also include less attractive options such as fighting them directly, and acting cleverly or even legalistically. I have little I can say about the take-no prisoners-wars against Amalek[17] and Canaan except that they challenge me.

Another approach is also difficult. The “clever”/legalistic option which is seen in the Jews either borrowing (or asking[18]) their Egyptian neighbours for “silver and gold objects and garments[19]”, just before they left Egypt and never returned. There is a strong attempt to make this technically Kosher. After the Jews left Egypt, Moses having told Pharaoh that they were going to the desert for three days[20], the Jews suddenly turn back toward Egypt[21] . This was because God “did not want the Jews to be liars, as you had said we will go for three days and will return and borrowed vessels…therefore you should turn around to stand on your faithfulness…” Perhaps conveniently, Pharaoh goes out to war against them and does not allow them to return so it will be his fault that they cannot go back or return what they borrowed [22]. Oh well.

Yet, there is a broader context here. In the Talmud, this act is justified as constituting a round about way of receiving the unpaid wages for the Jewish slaves[23]. There is surely a difference between being legalistic when one is in the right or when is in the wrong. The message for me in this is that there are times when things get messy, where broadly speaking one is morally entitled to fight, even in those situations it is important to dot the i’s and cross the t’s. I don’t think it is about legitimising legal fictions and legalistic arguments in cases where the broad moral balance is against the action one is taking.    

Conclusion

There is more to the sources than first meets the eye. While playing games with people is generally wrong, when God does it to a tyrant there could be a message of hope in it. Despite Judaism’s ultimate aspiration for universal peace, it is has a range of ideas about managing conflict until that time. One of these is the deep sadness of the loss of every human life, even if he is a soldier in the army of a wicked oppressor. Of course, using legalistic arguments to defend the indefensible is inexcusable, yet legalistic considerations have their place in the pursuit of justice, even the case of an unforgivable crime such as the slavery in Egypt. The letter of the law must be considered, even if one is in the clear according to its spirit. Some of this is uncomfortable for me, other aspects are inspiring, but this is what I have been able to find for now.  

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[1] Rashi, Ramban, Chizkuni, translate הִתְעַלַּלְתִּי as meaning either played with or mockery, relating to a similar word to in Isaiah 3:4, the same understanding of the word is supported by MaHari Kra, Metzudat Tzion, and Metzudat David

[2] Exodus 10:2

[3] Targum Unkelus, Targum Yonatan Ben Uziel. Another alternative relating to pruning a vineyard is found in a manuscript of Lekach Tov, cited in Torah Shlaima parshat Bo, p3-4

[4] Deuteronomy 28:63

[5] Talmud Sanhedrin 39b, the spelling of the word relating to rejoice over the destruction  is spelled  יָשִׂישׂ  which means will cause others to rejoice, if it mean that God Himself would rejoice the spelling would have been with ו a instead of a י

[6] ibid

[7] Psalms 2:4

[8] Meiri commentary on the Psalms

[9] Tana Dbei Eliyahu

[10] Ibn Ezra commentary on Deuteronomy 28:63, this is so out of step with the Talmud Sanhedrin that Avi Ezer states that Ibn Ezra must have overlooked it

[11] Job 35:7

[12] Exodus 13:17

[13] Ohr Hachayim

[14] Talmud Megila 10b, and Sanhedrin 39b

[15] Shemot Rabba 23:8

[16] Rabbi Yitzchok Abarbanel in his Passover commentary Zevach Pesach, cited on http://www.askmoses.com/en/article/169,2202336/Why-do-we-pour-wine-out-of-the-cup-at-the-Seder.html

[17] Exodus 17, is where it first appears 

[18] The Hebrew word is וְשָׁאֲלָה which although it can mean borrow, it can also mean ask for an outright gift which is how it is understood by Rabbenu Bachaya and Rashbam, cited in Leibovitz, N, (1996) New Studies in Shemot, The Joint Authority for Jewish Zionist Education, Jerusalem, p.188

[19] Exodus

[20] Exodus 3:18

[21] Exodus 14:2-4

[22] Bchor Shor, Mosad Rav Kook edition, 2000, Jerusalem p.120

[23] Talmud Sanhedrin 91a

Facts, Prejudice & Pessimism (Pharaoh & Politicians)

"But it’s true!”, cry out those accused of racism. It seems that to avoid prejudice, we are expected to pretend certain facts are not there. Pessimists would make a similar truth argument against optimism. Martin Seligman convincingly argues in Learned Optimism[1] that we do not need to ignore the evidence to be optimistic, rather we can choose among alternative honest explanations of all the “facts”. This approach can also work with prejudice. In one of the earliest records of prejudice, against the Hebrews in ancient Egypt, some of these issues play out. The key idea in this article is that we can be truthful and still beat prejudice and pessimism by focusing, when appropriate, on positive aspects of the truth, while at other times we can choose to face up to the negatives.

Head in the sand?

Recently, Australian parliamentarian Teresa Gambaro suggested that migrants be taught about using deodorant and waiting in a que, and Rick Santorum, an American presidential candidate referred to blacks on welfare[2]. Gambaro unreservedly apologised and said she was taken out of context, while Santorum denies he said the word black. I wonder about the facts, is there a real deodorant and que problem? NAACP President Benjamin Todd Jealous, blasted Mr. Santorum, “In Iowa for example, only nine percent of food stamp recipients are black, while eighty-four percent of recipients are white”. Jealous ignores the fact that there are far more whites than blacks in Iowa (91% white to nearly 3% black[3]). It seems that we are all supposed to be nice and just pretend that this obvious hole in the argument is just not there. I do not think either statement as reported, was appropriate, but why not? 

Realists in Ancient Egypt?

According to the Torah’s account of “social integration” in ancient Egypt, the truth did not look good. The Hebrews were not going to fit in, it did not matter how long they were in the country they could still be described as those “coming to Egypt[4]” in the present tense, as if they always just arriving[5]. They did not change their language or their names[6]; “They did not call Reuben, Rufus, nor did they call Shimon, Lulini[7]”. In contrast to the sexually liberated Egyptians, they had very conservative attitudes to women; they would not even look at each other’s wives[8]. Shepherding, a common occupation of the migrants, was an abomination to Egyptians[9].

They were not a marginal group. These outsiders had already managed to occupy the second highest office in the land, secure the best agricultural land[10] and they were rich[11]. Their birth-rate was as high[12] as that of rodents[13] to the point where the land was filled with them[14]. It was like an infestation of reeds[15]. Whenever an Egyptian went to get some entertainment they found the theatres were full of them[16]. These internationalists could also migrate out of the land[17] of Egypt just at the moment when their labour was needed most[18]. Was it unreasonable for the Egyptians to be concerned and pessimistic about those people? 

 

Realist and pessimist

Until this week, I would have described myself as a realist rather than an optimist or pessimist. I do not agree with the idea that if you think positive thoughts about something you want, “the universe” or God for that matter will give it to you. There is evidence that pessimists are generally been better at discerning reality than optimists[19], at least when thinking about them calmly. On the other hand, pessimists are more likely to fail to achieve their goals, feel depressed and have poorer health[20].

I did a test to measure my degree of optimism and pessimism, particularly the degree to which I think of both good and bad events as being permanent, pervasive and personal. I found that in some ways I think like an unrealistic pessimist. With negative events, I have been likely to think of them as reflective of what happens generally (permanent), as them being part of a broader pattern rather than isolated to that particular issue (pervasive) and I tend to take responsibility for it (personal). With positive events, I am more likely to think of it as a fluke or a lucky break (neither permanent nor personal) and more specific to that issue rather than thinking of it in a broader sense (not pervasive). I was not being consistent or logical and that alternative explanations could be even more realistic so I was free to choose those[21].

Methods for honest positive living

In some cases, our negative perception is backed up by a set of facts. With those situations, it depends on the context and the timing. If a lot is at stake, we might do well to take a pessimistic view about the risks, rather than just hope it will all take care of itself. If we are in a position to take action and deal with it, we can replace our worry with determination to address the problem[22]. If we are worrying about them when we are in middle of something else, it would be sensible to tell ourselves that this not the time for thinking about this, and actually schedule an alternative time to deal with it[23].

Other than dealing or delaying dealing with the problem itself, Selikman’s main strategy for dealing with pessimistic beliefs is disputation with oneself, which can still be relevant in spite of a negative set of facts. Disputation has four main components, i) evidence, ii) alternatives, iii) implications and iv) usefulness. For example, it is late at night, I am feeling washed out and I notice that I am doing less than my fair share of the house work, so I think I am lousy person and feel sadder still. I can challenge the idea that I am a lousy person with evidence; “no I am not a selfish person there are other times when I do pull my weight or act altruistically, although I can do better in doing my fair share of house work”. When the evidence is against an optimistic view, I can still question the usefulness of a negative view, consider its implications and look for alternative ways of explaining the event. Eg. seeing myself as a lousy person will not motivate me to do anything about it, like the Chasidic saying “to be depressed is no a sin, but the harm it can cause, no sin can cause[24]”. It is more useful to think of my selfish act as a wrong choice, which I can make differently next time.

Application to Prejudice – then and now

There is a clear application of these types of arguments to prejudice, especially the usefulness and implications arguments as well as the possibility of change. The ancient Egyptians had their negative facts, but in a remarkable midrash, Pharaoh first tells his people they would be crazy to act against the nation that produced Joseph who saved them. They responded by deposing him for three months. He then agreed to see it their way[25], so he was reinstated as if he was a new king[26] and became the fear monger in chief. Their conservative family life could be seen as an asset, people in stable relationships are likely to be less distracted and more productive at work. Their abundant children and wealth could be seen as opportunities for Egyptian business, the Hebrews were not shopping on-line! In fact our sages say that the land was blessed because of the Hebrews[27].   

Mr. Santorum is not factually wrong when he refers to blacks on welfare, nor can one argue with his ethical point about wanting to replace welfare with work[28]. The problem is the implication of his statement; it reinforces a negative image of blacks. A more useful alternative would be to talk about people on welfare generally and as Mr. Jealous pointed out the total number of whites in this predicament is greater than that of blacks. If the context was different, if it was a conference about the welfare of blacks, that statement would have greater justification. Similarly, I was involved in a work situation where someone who happened to be a migrant had a problem with hygiene, if this was found to be a broader problem than addressing this in a focused, tactful way is appropriate. The way it came across in the media, it reinforced some prejudices about smelly foreigners[29].  

The Torah prohibits speaking about the faults of others unless it is for a legitimate purpose[30], eg. providing accurate information about a prospective marriage partner or to deal with a crime. It even avoids denigrating anything, except where this is needed for a purpose[31]. If we are convinced of a fault in another group and we can do something practical about it then we should, otherwise we need to consider additional evidence about whether it is as pervasive, permanent, or essential to people as it seems. Not everything that is true is worth saying. We also need to be mindful of the implications of what we might say and seek the most useful way to talk about it. Often it is optimistic.

  

When Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Beditchev saw a wagon-driver, wearing tallit and tefillin (holy prayer objects, normally only worn during prayer and treated with respect) whilst oiling the wheels of his wagon, Reb Levi Yitzchak exclaimed, “What a holy people is Israel! Even when they oil the wheels of their wagons, they are praying![32]”

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[1]     Seligman, M, E, P, (1990), Learned Optimism, Random House, Australia

[2]     http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FxBiyb3gR3k&feature=related

[3]     http://www.drudge.com/news/152110/naacp-calls-santorum-outrageous

[4]     Exodus 1:1

[5]     Rabbi YY Tronk of Kutno, cited in Greenberg, A. Y.,  (1992), Torah Gems, Y. Orenstein Yavneh Publishing, Tel Aviv

[6]     Mechilta Mesechta Pesachim Bo 5

[7]     Shir Hashirim Rabba, cited in Torah Shlaima, Shemot, p 9, note that the rejected names were latin, which was relevant to the times in which this was written

[8]     Yelamdenu

[9]     Genesis 46:34

[10]    Genesis 47:6

[11]    Lekach Tov

[12]    Midrash Tanchuma Pekudei 9 ,states that there are some Rabbis who state that they were giving birth twins while others say they were having sextuplets

[13]    Midrash quoted in Rabbenu Bchai, and Daat Zekainim Mibaalei Hatosafot, cited in Torah Shlaima, Shemot, p 15

[14]    Exodus 1:7

[15]    Midrash Tanchuma Shemot 5 eg. bamboo is considered a weed in Australia, we have some growing on the side of our driveway and we have seen them grow and spread very quickly).

[16]    Old Midrash Tanchuma Shemot 5

[17]    Exodus 1:10

[18]    Bchor Shor

[19]   Seligman, p.109-111

[20]   Seligman

[21]   Seligman addresses the question about the need for taking personal responsibility, which is a strength. In some situations it is the right way to think about a problem so that we can solve it. In other situations, one can take a disproportionate amount of responsibility for things that are not entirely under our own control, in such cases one cannot correct the problem and instead it is just demoralising and depressing. A variation of this dilemma is discuss in Tanya, if I see myself as wicked I will become depressed, but if I am happy despite seeing myself as wicked then I will become callous  or irresponsible (Rabbi Schenur Zalman of Liadi, chapter 1).

[22] Tanya, Rabbi Schenur Zalman of Liadi, chapter 31,

[23]  Tanya, chapter 26, Seligman p. 218

[24]  R. Shlomo of Karlin, http://www.sichosinenglish.org/books/the-chassidic-approach-to-joy/02.htm same statement with different wording,

[25]   Midrash, Shemot Rabba 1:9, Midrash Tanchuma 5

[26]  Exodus 1:8, and there arose a new king over Egypt who did not know Joseph

[27]  Midrash Chefetz, from a manuscript cited in Torah Shlaima, p.18

[28]  Mimonedes’ highest level of charity is to help someone get on to their own feet.

[29]  Professor, Andrew Jakubowicz http://www.smh.com.au/national/truss-raps-gambaro-for-migrant-hygiene-remark-20120110-1ptjs.html

[30] Hilchot Lashon Hara, sefer Chafetz Chaim, http://www.torah.org/learning/halashon/chapter10.html

[31]  The Lubavitcher Rebbe

[32] http://www.oztorah.com/2008/10/noah-was-a-righteous-man-noach/ with some variation in details reflecting the way the story was told to me 

Egypt – what is the right question for a Jew?

Elation and ambivalence

For many Jews the chaotic uprising in Egypt elicits our natural affinity with the oppressed, perhaps even evokes the drama of our own Egyptian liberation, complete with the chaos of the plagues. For some the joy is tempered by fear. What are the right questions for a Jew to ask?

It is good for the Jews?

Perhaps this is not the best question. It is one that survival instincts have programmed in Jewish minds.  Jews have paid a bloody price for events that were not “about us” regardless of what was happening, be it crusaders setting out to capture Jerusalem, or Chmielnicki rising up for the peasants. Times have changed, we are no longer the 'niggers' of the world. Yes, anti-Semitism persists but the power dynamic and scale of persecution is dramatically different.

Jewish woman: The black taxi driver called me a kike (when he was not happy with the tip).

Black Woman: You can get a taxi, when I wait for a cab they don't stop[1].

With the changed circumstances, I think the balance must shift a bit more to the second half of the great teaching. “If I am not for myself, who is for me, but if I am only for myself what am I?[2]”

Pre-emptive self defence

Some would argue that the imperative of being “for myself”, not relying on others for our survival is the most relevant point here. I have never faced the horrors of war. I do not have the expertise to ascertain the potential threat of extremists cancelling the peace treaty with Israel and a renewal of major wars.  Instead, I will explore more generally relevant principles and sources.

The principle of self defence is articulated as follows. “If a thief will be found in a tunnel (that a thief might digs under the walls of a house), and he will hit and die, he has no blood. If the sun arose on him, he has blood”[3]. This is the source for the principle that if “someone comes to kill you, arise and kill him”. At the time this was written, there was no home insurance, banks or welfare so the assumption the thief “knows that a person will not stand and see his money being taken and be silent, therefore (the thief) came on the basis that if the owner of the money will stand up to him he will kill him”[4].  The exception to this principle, is if it is clear to the home-owner (represented by the metaphor of the rising sun) that thief will not kill him, the self defence justification for violence falls away[5].

This suggests that a clear risk justifies violence or other harsh defensive acts. How much risk justifies pre-emptive measures needs to be considered with a full understanding of the situation.

Respect and Suspect

Our guidance varies in relation to caution and trust. We are taught to judge every man to the side of merit[6]. Yet, we are told that “always, let every man be seen by you and a thief and (at the same time) respect them as if they were (the great) Rabban Gamliel[7]. A story illustrates this idea.

A man visited Rabbi Yehoshua, who gave him food and drink and showed him to (a place to sleep) on the top of floor. Rabbi Yehoshua removed the ladder beneath him. What did this man do? He got up at midnight, spread out his robe, took vessels (belonging to R. Yehosha) bundled them into his robe, tried to go down, fell and broke his elbow. In the morning R. Yehoshua came and found him. Empty one! This is what people like you do? Said R. Yehoshua. “I did not know you took the ladder from under me”, the guest replied. He said to him, “don’t you know we were careful about you from yesterday”[8].

We are also taught if one suspects the innocent they are punished in their body. As we see with Moses[9] who suspected that the Israelites “will not believe” him[10].  A judge is told to see litigants as wicked when they stand before him but as righteous after they have accepted the judgement[11]. I have not yet managed to get clarity with this[12] in general much less in the case of Egypt.

Is it good?

I think a better question is simply to ask if what is happening in Egypt is good. The answer must be yes, when we are talking about the removal of a tyrannical dictator, who reportedly employed 2 million secret police, yet failed to adequately protect minorities such as the Copts.

Judaism believes there are seven obligations for all people on the earth and one of these is the establishment of justice. I cried when the statue of Sadaam fell in Bagdad, as will so many liberated Egyptians when Honsi creates a space for justice to be pursued[13].

Freedom for any depends on freedom for all

Proclaim liberty throughout the land for all its inhabitants[14] the Torah states in relation to freeing slaves. Yet, surely the proclamation is one of freedom for slaves, why does it say “all its inhabitants? Penei Yehoshua explains, in any country where freedom is incomplete even if only a few are slaves, all the people are slaves. Slavery is an affliction which afflicts slave, master and by-stander. In todays global village, I think this can be applied more broadly.

As a Jew, I am thrilled that men and women in Egypt will soon be free. I pray this will indeed be the case and that will be good not only for the Egyptians but also for my brothers and sisters in Israel.

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[1] Goldstein, T, (2001),’ I’m Not White’: Anti Racist Teacher Education for White Early Childhood Educators, Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood, Volume 2,  Number 1, 2001.

[2] Pirkey Avot, 1:14

[3] Exodus 22:1-2

[4] Rashi on Exodus 22:1

[5] Mechilta, Talmud Sanhedrin 62, an example of this is a father coming to rob his child.

[6]  Pirkey Avot 1:6

[7]  Masechet Kala Rabbati chapter 9

[8]  Ibid

[9]  Exodus 4

[10] Talmud Shabbat 97a and Talmud Yoma 19b 

[11] Pirkey Avot 1:8.

[12] A distinction is suggested in Kalla Rabbati between someone you know to whom we would apply the principle of “do not judge your friend until you have been in his position”, but strangers can be judged. The Talmud in Yoma would fit this interpretation because the context there is suspicion against a Kohen Gadol (high priest). It is harder to reconcile with the case of Moses suspecting the Jewish people as a whole, most of whom were strangers to him, it also does not sit well with “judging every man favourably” in Pirkey Avot 1:6

[13] I explored the Torah case for democracy in an earlier post http://torahforsociallyawarehasid.blogspot.com/2011/01/gods-way-halacha-shariah-vs-democracy.html

[14] Leviticus 25:10