Showing posts with label Halacha. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Halacha. Show all posts

Friday, May 18, 2012

Inheritance Laws, Gender, Sharia & Halacha – An honest/diversity competence perspective


Last Thursday I attended a seminar on “Gender Differences and Inheritance”. I was moved by some ideas, impressed with the sincerity, the integrity and the inclusion of a female scholar on the panel who showed courage in raising an inconvenient practical problem. Some of it challenged me. I have been thinking a lot about what it means to be competent in responding to diversity. I think of the experience of a Greens party campaigner who told me how she managed to connect with campaigners from a far right party called One Nation. She realised they were not monsters, but people like her who wanted the best for their families and the community. Connecting with people we strongly disagree with is one of the great tasks of our time.

In this post I explore two issues, inheritance laws in Islam and Judaism and how this issue is to be dealt with in terms of interfaith respect and appreciation.

Some basic rules of inheritance in Islam
In Islam, I heard, sons inherit twice as much as daughters. The disparity is justified because men have responsibilities in Islam to support women as breadwinners. Impressively, one of the panellists raised the problem of Muslim men who shirk their responsibility. In Muslim majority countries, courts can compel them to contribute more, but there is not much that Muslim communities can do about this in non-Muslim countries.

We also learned that the widow gets 1/8 of the inheritance. In Malaysia a way was found, with approval from Islamic authorities, to give the family home to the widow. Essentially this is compensation for the income she did not earn while looking after the family. This solution was dismissed by the Islamic authority on the panel. ‘I don’t know where they got that Fatwa from’ he said, but he was quite sure it was wrong. 

An Interfaith/diversity competence perspective
On the surface, interfaith respect means that we respect each other despite our different beliefs. I suggest that it is easy when the differences are not something we care a lot about e.g one person prays 5 times while another prays 3 times. It is trickier, when the difference relates to strong opinions about what is right. When Abraham sees his father’s idols he doesn’t say, I respect his beliefs, instead he smashes them[i]. I think it is useful for me to honestly examine my discomfort and find my way to continue to respect and connect with Muslims, with integrity.  

Can an outsider understand?
One speaker at the seminar explained that it is important to consider Sharia as a holistic system of ways of living that cover every facet of life of the individual, families and communities. I agree that my capacity to fully understand the issue is limited by lack of experience of Islam as an outsider. A similar argument has been made against certain forms of interfaith dialogue; that religious experience is too intimate to be understood by an outsider[ii].

Diversity within Faith Communities- and the higher purpose of Shariah
It was clear that despite the view of the scholar on the panel, there were other substantial Islamic scholars who found a way to give a widow far more than he thought was right. An Imam I know suggested that the Malaysians might be following the principle of Maqasid[iii] (Maqasid at Shari’ah). My understanding of this approach is that it considers the broad purposes of the law alongside the letter of the law. Key purposes are compassion and benefit. “A mere conformity to rules that went against the purpose and vision of the Shari’ah was therefore generally unacceptable”. Perhaps the broader consideration of compassion in changed social conditions is being prioritised in the Malaysian approach.

Common Ground, Jewish Inheritance law
In Judaism the basic law in the written Torah itself is that sons get everything, the firstborn son gets double the amount inherited by the other sons, the daughters get nothing[iv], and the widow is not mentioned.

Classic texts of the oral law give a somewhat different picture.  The widow is entitled to have her needs provided for from the estate for the rest of her life in a way that is according to her honour and that of her late husband[v]. Daughters must be provided for until the age of puberty for food, clothes as needed rather than what she is accustomed to. Daughters past the age of puberty still inherit nothing, but daughters regardless of age can get up to 1 tenth of the estate to help pay for their “dowry”[vi]. Both widow and young daughters are also entitled to a place to live from the estate.

Based on the classic sources here is a partial comparison in the following scenario; Abraham age 60 is a devoutly religious man who dies in a plane crash. The estate is worth 3 million dollars including the family home which is worth $500,000. Abraham and his wife Sarah 53 had five children; son Aaron 22, married daughter Bracha 20, daughter Chaya 16, son Daniel 14 and daughter Elka 10.  Abraham’s mother, Freida aged 80 is still alive.
Family member
Classic Jewish Inheritance Law
Islamic law*- based on Seminar as applied in Western countries a helpful website[i] and my limited understanding
Islamic Law* as apparently practiced in Malaysia according to seminar and my limited understanding
Current Jewish Practice
Mother Freida aged 80
$0
$500,000
$333,333
? any thing
Sarah 58- the widow
Expenses (rough figure $500,000) to live in dignity including unlimited use of family home
$375,000 + obligations by men of family
$250,000 + family home (total $750,000) and obligations by men of family
Family home + any
thing?
First-born son Aaron age 22
$1,266,666
$607,142
$404,761
Might be divided equally between children but could be any thing
Married daughter Bracha age 20
$0
$303,571 and obligations by men of family
$202,380 and obligations by men of family
daughter Chaya age 16
$0 but up to $300,000 dowry
$303,571 and obligations by men of family
$202,380 and obligations by men of family
son Daniel age 14
$633,333
$607,142
$404,761
daughter Elka age 10
Expenses (basic til puberty $30,000) and up to $270,000 dowry[ii]
$303,571 and obligations by men of family
$202,380 and obligations by men of family

[i] http://www.islamicsoftware.org/irth/irth.html
[ii] Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer Laws of Ketubot, 113:4, the second dowry is calculated after deducting older daughter Chaya’s $300,000 from the total)
* Note: in Islam there is discretion about 1/3rd of the estate.

Jewish “inheritance” in practice
There is a massive loop hole that makes Jewish inheritance laws practically irrelevant. If one used language to indicate that he wishes to gift his property in a way that is inconsistent with inheritance law he can do so[ix], which means he can give the sons, daughters of anyone else whatever they wish, including completely equal parts for all. There are other formulas that essentially amount to getting around the inheritance laws, which are recommended as part of a Halachic will by the Beth Din (religious court)[x]. What I find particularly interesting about this, is that this is done despite the explicit instructions to preserve inheritance law as an eternal law[xi]. It appears that customs began to emerge centuries ago not to give the first born son his double portion and this deviation was frowned upon[xii]. One opinion recommends a token gesture of leaving a small portion of the estate out of the formulas that get around the laws to obey the inheritance law at least symbolically[xiii].

Integrity & religious certainty
The sweepingly liberal application of Jewish law in this case can mean that men and women enjoy equality in inheritance. On the other hand I find it hard to explain how orthodox Jews can insist that every word of the Torah is the word of God handed down from Sinai[xiv] while almost completely going around a phrase “he will not be able to grant the son of his beloved wife the status of first born…but the first born son of the hated wife he must recognise to give him a double portion[xv]”. I am sure the scholars of the Talmud use their own rigorous methods, but I must acknowledge that the Imam taking the view that the inheritance laws are an expression of God’s wisdom shows consistency and integrity by refusing to find ways around it.

One of the diversity competence skills I have learned from my colleague, Donna Jacobs Sife is to be aware of and reflect on my own discomfort. So I ask myself, am I reacting to religious certainty based on the broad narrative that if Muslims are too religious, they will also be hostile to non-Muslims? I know that in my own tradition, those who take a less certain and literalist view are more often more respectful of other faiths. I also know very devout Muslims who take every word in Quran as the word of God and this reinforces their positive attitude to non-Muslims. I should not makes assumptions that project what happens in my own community or what seems to be the case with Christian fundamentalists on Muslims. I also know Jewish and Christian literalists who are deeply committed to interfaith respect. 

The choice between taking every work as the word of God is a big one. When I was in London as a 16 year old, I was told by a Jewish Cabbie, “God law is wrong”. When I asked him why he told me “I am a Mamzer, (a Bastard[xvi]) when I wanted to get married in my synagogue I was not allowed to”. He felt very humiliated because of this and was still enraged years later. “If I see Dayan Ehrentreu (chief of the London Beth Din) walking down the street, I would run him down with my cab” he told me. In his case, religious certainty led him to be publicly humiliated through no fault of his own. In practice, classic Jewish or Islamic Inheritance law might be quite harsh in certain situations on some women. I love the way some scholars in both faiths have found ways to mitigate the impact.

I would be easier on some people if people believed that the laws in the books were not binding. On the other side of the ledger, religious certainty is the deeply held position of billions of people. It motivates people to extraordinary generosity, personal sacrifice, and care for elderly parents or disabled children.  I was welcomed warmly by these “un-moderate Muslims” at the seminar, I think because of Islamic teachings of hospitality. My own children have been raised as I have been with religious certainty, I am grateful for how they are growing up and for my own parents modelling principle centered living, what matters most was what is right.  There are three atheists I know personally who are similarly virtuous, but that does not negate the religious pathway to virtue.  

Conclusion
It would be easier to avoid talking about this at all. Just to say that Jews and Muslims have a lot in common and I admire the many Muslims I come into contact with. I think for a real acceptance of each other, it is important to honestly grapple with the things that make us uncomfortable. The options I had were a) to recognise the limits of my understanding as an outsider, b) to try to get additional insight within the limits of what an outsider can understand, this approach yielded the fascinating ideas about the higher purposes of Sharia and helped me recognise the diversity of opinions within the faith c) I noticed a fair bit of common ground at least in the classic sources and d) I respect the integrity of the decision making without pretending to be comfortable with the decision. This is how I continue to deeply appreciate my fellow men and women, who follow Islam.


[i] This is story appears in the Midrash Bresheet Rabba 38, and is also told by Muslims
[ii] Soloveitchic, Rabbi JB, (1964) in Confrontation, http://www.bc.edu/dam/files/research_sites/cjl/texts/cjrelations/resources/articles/soloveitchik/
“The word of faith reflects the intimate, the private, the paradoxically inexpressible cravings of the individual for and his linking up with his Maker. It reflects the numinous character and the strangeness of the act of faith of a particular community which is totally incomprehensible to the man of a different faith community”.
[iii] Kamali, Mohammed Hashim (2010), He is Professor of Law at the International Islamic University Malaysia. He is author of numerous articles published in learned journals and many works including Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Criminal Law in Islam and Freedom of Expression in Islam.  http://www.faithinallah.org/higher-objectives-of-islamic-law-maqasid-ash-sharia/
[iv] Numbers 27:8-11, Deuteronomy 21:17
[v] Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer Laws of Ketubot, 112:6
[vi] Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer Laws of Ketubot, 113:1
[vii] http://www.islamicsoftware.org/irth/irth.html
[viii] Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer Laws of Ketubot, 113:4, the second dowry is calculated after deducting older daughter Chaya’s $300,000 from the total)
[ix] Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, laws of inheritance, 381:7
[xi] Rabbenu Bchaya, on Numbers 27:11 commenting on the words “Chukat Mishpat”
[xii] Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, laws of inheritance, 381:4 citing Marik Shoresh 8
[xiii] Responsa of Tashbaz, Vol.3 No.147, cited by Ksos Hachoshen, 352(2). See also Responsa, Chasan Sofer, Choshen Mishpat, 151. Cited in Dick, J, Halacha and the Conventional Last Will and Testament,  http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/last_will_and_testament1.html accessed 18/05/12
[xiv] Note Rashi’s commentary based on Torah Cohanim to Leviticus 25:1, what is the link between Shemita and Mt. Sinai, all the general principles and details are all from Sinai
[xv] Deuteronomy 21:16-17
[xvi] This status could be the result of a child being born from a mother that is religiously considered married to a previous husband from whom she is legally but not religiously divorced and conceived with a new partner

Friday, May 4, 2012

Revenge, Torah and Christianity

Anger, By Shubhojoy Mitra, creative commons license
http://www.cyberartgallery.org/?gallery=portal

The movie Ajami is an Israeli-Palestinian co-production that for me is about the heartbreaking cost of revenge. Much of the plot is driven by two Arabic teenagers, one a gentle sweet faced boy of around 14 who is a bit of an artist, and their family being pursued by a Bedouin crime family bent on avenging the death of one of theirs, unless they receive a financially crippling payment of blood money. An Israeli character also has his own vengeance to attend to after his soldier-brother is found dead near a Palestinian village. I empathised with both the Israeli and Arabic characters, portrayed as every day human beings who deeply love their families. Apart from humanising protagonists from both sides, my overwhelming impression was of the horrible needless suffering directly flowing from the perceived for some kind of vengeance.

I wonder if my low tolerance for revenge is the result of Christian influences on me, particularly from a young devout Christian peace builder I greatly admire named Jarrod McKenna. I remember when I first started work as a Rabbi 15 years ago, I was teaching a young adult about divine retribution as one of the themes the Friday night prayers. At the time, I thought this idea of divine justice was quite beautiful, righting the wrongs of the world. My student challenged me, would it not be better if at the end of days no one suffered? I remember reflecting on how different my perspective had been to that of my student who was raised with more exposure to Christian and secular influences.

These influences have been blocked out to some extent in the Hasidic community in Crown Heights that I was raised in. One on level it is fair enough for communities to stay true to their own teachings, the question is how to do that while fostering respectful interfaith relationships. The International Council of Christians and Jews’ called on Jewish communities to include basic and accurate background information about Christianity in the Curricula of Jewish schools[i]. In my very orthodox Chasidic community this is simply not going to happen.  I will not argue about the core objection to learning about other faiths generally, except to share what I was told by Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks[ii] that schools could teach about other faiths in the same way as one learns about other cultures.

This post looks at Torah sources about revenge and considers the Jewish- Christian relationship in that light.  

Prohibition of revenge and promotion of forgiveness
The verse “an eye for an eye[iii]” is not about revenge but monetary compensation[iv]. Revenge and even holding a grudge is forbidden in the text of the Torah[v]. One way to overcome the urge for revenge is by considering a case of a person cutting meat that accidentally cuts his arm, would he then take revenge and cut the hand that was holding the knife[vi]?! Faith can help a person see the hand of God in the offence, and this can help him not bear a grudge against the person who ‘acts as God’s tool’[vii].  This is dramatically played out in the story of Joseph when he insists on not holding a grudge against his brothers who sold him into slavery because he sees it all as fulfilment of God’s plan so that he could save many lives during the famine in Egypt[viii]. In the prayers before going to sleep, we proclaim forgiveness for anyone who sinned against me… in this life or another life…no one should be punished on my account[ix]

Permission and even encouragement of revenge
The teachings against revenge need to be considered alongside other guidance such as the clear instructions to take revenge against Midiyan[x] and never to forget the evil deeds of Amalek who attacked you us when we were vulnerable[xi]. This apparent contradiction is probably the reason the Talmud gives a very mundane example to illustrate this principle, a case of two people who want to borrow tools from each other. Refusal to lend a tool should not be reciprocated or even mentioned[xii]. The definition is narrowed to exclude cases of in which there is a monetary obligation[xiii], or in offenses against one’s body where there has been no apology[xiv], or murder in which case the relative would be encouraged to “redeem the blood” of his relative by killing his relatives killer with permission of the court[xv]. Scholars are encouraged to stand up against people who disrespect them, one sage going so far as to state that any sage that does not take revenge and hold a grudge like a snake is no scholar[xvi].  This has been explained as being about disrespect of the Torah the stage studied. Even God himself is portrayed (in addition to compassionate etc) as a God of vengeance[xvii]. One explanation of this is that God conquers anger while in a person who takes revenge the anger will conquer him[xviii].

Another consideration is that the prohibition of revenge refers explicitly to “the sons of your nation” and is understood to apply only between Jews[xix]. One argument by an East European commentator of the 16th early 17th century is that “disputes between Jews will typically be about unimportant offenses relating to money or body that don’t merit revenge but when revenge is permitted against someone from another nation because typically he wants to cause you to transgress the commandments of God and to lead you astray from God[xx].  In his context that was probably true, yet it is ridiculous and highly offensive not to recognise the change of heart and efforts of Christians in the 2nd half of the 20th century toward reconciliation with the Jews.

A bold idea, embracing enemies
My Christian friend Jarrod is into radical peace building. He is not a saint and felt plenty of anger when a man he knew was murdered. Yet he believes that he is called to love his enemies. The Truth and Reconciliation process in South Africa seems to be an example of the value of that kind of approach. While not the same, parallel teaching can be found in Judaism. Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi famously warned his followers about his opponents known as Mitnagdim who framed him and caused him to be imprisoned in Czarist Russia. He called on his followers not to “jeer nor whistle derisively at them, heaven forfend… (instead to respond to their opponents)… with “a soft answer [that] turns away anger[xxi],” and with a restrained spirit. And through all that, perhaps God will put [a conciliatory and loving response] into the heart of their brethren[xxii] God tells the offended party, “let your love for me overcome the hatred you have with him and through this peace will come between you[xxiii] and in another version,” let your love with him” presumably the one who hurt you, overcome the hatred…so that peace will come to the world[xxiv]”.

Conclusion
As a Jew, I still see some merit in the arguments that retribution has its place. There is a reason for the presence of this device in so many cultures. There are flawed human beings who will only restrain their unsavoury impulses out of fear of punishment[xxv]. While my tradition provides a mix of ideas about how to respond to grievances, I think in many cases it is worth emphasising the more generous teachings and applying them to people regardless of race or religion. Yet, there is something to be admired in the bold, positive, “game changing” approach of Christians to their enemies that can be supported by teachings within my own tradition.


[i] A time for recommitment, the twelve points of Berlin: A call to Christian and Jewish communities worldwide
[ii] Conversation I had with the Chief Rabbi at a private visit in his home March 2011
[iii] Exodus 21:24
[iv] Mechilta on Exodus and the Talmud in Ketuvot 32b and Bava Kamma 83b
[v] Leviticus 19:17
[vi] Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:4
[vii] Sefer Hachinuch Mitzvah 247, Tanya: Igeret HaKodesh - Epistle 25
[viii] Genesis 50:20
[ix] Siddur Tehilat Hashem p.141
[x] Number 31:2
[xi] Deuteronomy 25:17-19
[xii] Talmud Yoma 23a
[xiii] Ramban
[xiv] Hizkuni 19:17
[xv] Ramban
[xvi] Talmud Yoma 23a, commentary then softens it to say that the sage holds a grudge but does not fight back, he simply keeps it in his heart and then if someone else takes revenge on his behalf the sage is silent
[xvii] Psalms 94:1
[xviii] Hizkuni on
[xix] Kohelet Rabba 88:8
[xx] Klei Yakar, by Shlomo Ephraim ben Aaron Luntschitz (1550 –1619)
[xxi] Proverbs 15:1
[xxii] Tanya Igeret Hakodesh 2, translation from Chabad.org
[xxiii] Bchor shor
[xxiv] Hizkuni
[xxv] Pirkey Avot 3:2

Saturday, September 3, 2011

Dissent! When you think the Authority is Mistaken Shoftim 2011

Photo by Louisa Catlover
(Revision of post of 1 Sept 2011, Authority, Compliance, Defiance – Hazare, Gaddafi & the “Malaysia Solution” Shoftim)

I remember well, the moments in my working life when I was asked to act against my own conscience, these infuriated me or at least made me feel defiant. I thank God I was able to stand my ground. I can see the value of deferring to others and I accept that it cannot be right for everyone to do as they fit in all situations. Where does one draw the line?

In recent days we have witnessed the capture of Gaddafi’s compound, the cave-in of the Indian Government to hunger striker Anna Hazare and in Australia the successful court challenge of our Government’s strategy to transfer Asylum seekers to Malaysia. My Muslim friends have celebrated their Eid festival on two different days this week, some of them in compliance with the Australian Imam’s Council, others doing it their own way. Our Torah reading today is Shoftim/Judges, it is a good time to consider what the Torah has to say on the question of deferring to authority.

Obeying the Guidance
If there is a matter that is hard to determine, we must come to the priests, the Levites and the judge that will be in that time...you will do according to the word they tell you...you shall not turn from what they tell you to the right or to the left[i]. The simple meaning of “to the right or the left” is that we should not deviate at all from their instructions[ii].  But, this is also the jump off point for a discussion about dissent and compliance with the ruling of the Sanhedrin, the religious high court.

Even if they are wrong?
There are four perspectives on this. 1) We obey them even if they are wrong. 2) We not only obey them in spite of being convinced that they are wrong, we are also required to assume that we are mistaken. 3) We only obey the ruling of the Sanhedrin (Torah high court) if their rulings are correct. 4) There are complex ideas to consider when thinking about Right and wrong.

Even if they tell you right is left
Sifre states, “Even if it seems to you that they are telling you that right is left and left is right, obey them[iii]”. This phrase is quoted in Rashi, with one difference; he omits the words “it seems to you” and states it as if it were a fact, that the ruling is mistaken and telling to that right is left[iv]. Rashi’s intention is not entirely clear, one commentator on Rashi states that,” even if a person had a tradition from the great Beth Din in Jerusalem (the Sandhedrin) that he was present with them and they had told him that the law and now another Beth Din (religious court) is telling him the opposite that he received from many who were greater in wisdom and number, in spite of this he should not deviate as the one who commanded him to obey the Torah about that which forbidden and allowed has commanded this too..[v]”. This staggering statement essentially says that if the religious authority instructs you to do the wrong thing you should do it anyway.

You only think they are wrong
Another approach is both more comfortable and confronting. In this view, you only think you are right, but in fact the majority is right and you are wrong. You should not attribute the mistake to them, instead attribute the mistake to yourself. ...Because God will protect them from all errors so that (nothing but) the truth will come out of their mouths[vi]. This approach is more in keeping with the original phrase that Rashi is based on, which states that even if it seems to you (that he tells you about) right is left…[vii]. The overall effect of this ideas is that while you are not being asked to do something that is really wrong, you are being told to dismiss your our own views and trust that the authority has got it right. Ouch.

A Commentary whose meaning is disputed
The most challenging for me is the explanation by the Ramban who he lived over a thousand years after Jew law courts lost the authority to carry out capital punishment. He writes, “Even if you will think in your heart that they are mistaken and this matter is a simple in your eyes as your knowledge between your right and your left you should act according to their command. You should not say how can I eat this completely forbidden fat or (how can I) kill this innocent person. But you should say this is what I have been commanded by the master who commands me about all the commandments that I should do his commands in accordance with what I will be guided by those who stand before him...even if they err...[viii]. Other commentaries debate the meaning of Ramban because at the end of his explanation he mentions that God would protect the Sanhedrin from mistakes, while others see him as supporting the need to obey even mistaken guidance. Like natural laws that are generally good such as appetite but may occasionally cause harm, the overall impact of obeying the sages cancels out the harm of complying with the rare mistake[ix].

In practice both of these approaches tells the individual to disregard his own view. If follows a view in the Talmud if the dissenter has a tradition that something must be done one way and the majority asserts that they see it differently if he acts on his view he is killed so that there should not increase disputes among Israel[x]. This view is taken to be correct and is included in Jewish law[xi]. This is in relation to acting on different views after a decision was reached, prior to that robust debate is standard practice and appropriate. 

Corruptible Sages
The idea that the sages will be given divine assistance never to get it wrong must be considered alongside other teachings that warn of the corruptibility of all people including the greats. Do not believe in yourself until the day of your death[xii]! The judge is warned not take bribes because the bribe will blind the eyes of the wise and ruin the words of the righteous[xiii]. Similarly, The Holy One Blessed be He does not called a righteous person, righteous until he has been put in the grave. Why? Because all the days of his life he is beset by the evil inclination and God does not trust him in this world till the day of his death[xiv].
                                                                 
Corruption by the King Makers
There is also concern about the influence of the people who are the powers behind the throne who might retain an influence after installing someone as a judge. The change in form from the beginning to the end of the verse quoted above is instructive. judges and police officers shall you put in all your gates...and they shall judge the people a just justice[xv]. We start with an imperative instruction to the people to תתן appoint judges, this refers to people who are in a position of influence who can help select and appoint the judges. Then the language shifts to talk about what will happen “they will judge, justly” as if by themselves with the appointers out of the picture. This hints at the need for complete independence of the judiciary from the king makers, because if they remain dependent on those people there will never be justice[xvi]. No naïve assumptions of religious leaders retaining purity just by virtue of their office and past righteousness.

Only when they get it right
The same phrase telling us not to deviate right or left is interpreted in the exact opposite way by the Jerusalem Talmud to mean that you must only obey them when they get it right, and declare right to be right but not when they tell you that right is left[xvii]. This view is echoed in a later work “If they truly tell you that right is left eg. They allow the eating of forbidden fats…it is certainly forbidden to obey them[xviii]”.
More Complex than simple right or wrong/A need for Adaptation to Circumstances
Another explanation is that being that these are matters of logic, there cannot really be a “right and left”[xix], perhaps a warning to those who reduce complex judgements down to a simple right or wrong, just like right and left instead of recognising the nuances and validity of arguments to support either conclusion[xx].  Another view by Abarbanel[xxi] is that in normal circumstances the norms of Jewish law are “right”, such as the very narrow set of circumstances that would allow a court to execute a murderer, needing him to be warned right before the act etc. This “right” approach is completely wrong (or Left) in a situation of rampant murders when there is a need for greater deterrent[xxii].  The temple was destroyed because they judged (matters) by the (normal) law of the Torah[xxiii], rather than being adaptive.

Civil Disobedience
Despite the strong guidance about the need to obey the sages, obeying political leaders is quite a different matter[xxiv]. This is especially true with the midwives in Egypt who defied the evil king Pharaoh’s order to kill Jewish baby boys[xxv]. Even the generally righteous King Saul could get it wrong and his guards are seen to have done the right thing by refusing to obey his orders to kill priests in the city of Nov[xxvi]. Maimonides makes it very clear that when a King’s instructions contradict those of the Torah, the king is to be disobeyed[xxvii]. This follows the Talmudic idea, “the words of the teachers and the words of the students, which is to be obeyed?[xxviii] 

Conclusion
There is value in the preservation of authority but this is not an absolute value. The difference between following the sages when you think they are wrong or actually wrong is hypothetical, in both cases from the perspective of the dissenter the experience is the same. There must be recognition that the feeling that my perspective is as absolutely correct as my knowledge of my right and left hands is foolish. Every situation is different and requires flexible and sometimes subtle as well as bold judgement that will deviate from normal procedures. It can appear to an individual that left is being labelled as right, when in fact ultimate justice is being served by subverting normal Torah procedures. Deference and humility are useful here as is robust discussion where appropriate. Yet, there are certainly situations where human authority is overridden. I am not across the details of Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption efforts in India, but I think he is acting appropriately by fighting corruption, even if he is holding democratic institutions to ransom with his hunger strike. The rule of law is important but conscience and the rule of God must be given a lot of weight against simply “following orders” as we heard in the infamous Nuremburg defence. Further study would be useful as this topic is far from closed for me.


[i] Deuteronomy 17:9-11
[ii] Oonkelus translation, Bchor Shor
[iii] Sifre Piska 154
[iv] Rashi on
[v] Gur Aryeh, Rabbi Judah Loew ben Bezalel, (c. 1520 –1609) widely known as the Maharal of Prague, or simply The MaHaRaL
[vi] Sifse Chachamim
[vii] Sifre
[viii] Ramban on
[ix] Rabbenu Nissim
[x] Talmud, Sanhedrin 88a, the view of Rabbi Elazar
[xi] Maimonides, Yad Hachazakah, Hilchot Mamrim, 4:1
[xii] Pirkey Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) 2:5
[xiii] Deuteronomy 16:19
[xiv] Midrash Socher Tov 61a, cited in Weiss, Rabbi S, (1990) Insights: A Talmudic Treasury, Feldheim, Jerusalem,  p.41
[xv] Deuteronomy 16:18
[xvi] Klei Yakar
[xvii] Jerusalem Talmud Horiyos 1:1
[xviii] Torah Temima, Rabbi Baruch ha-Levi Epstein 1860-1941
[xix] Sifse Chachamim
[xx] Klei Yakar
[xxi] Isaac ben Judah Abrabanel, (1437 –1508),
[xxii] Let us put aside contemporary arguments about the actual deterrent value of capital punishment, this was written over 500 years ago
[xxiii] Talmud, Bava Metzia, 39b, a statement by Rabbi Yochanan which is applied to the need for going beyond the letter of the law but lends itself quite plausibly to this interpretation as well
[xxiv] The material in this paragraph is based on the work of Amsel, N, (1996) The Jewish Encyclopaedia of Moral and Ethical Issues, Jason Aronson, Northvale NJ, USA, p.43
[xxv] Exodus 1:15-19
[xxvi] Samuel I, 22:16-17
[xxvii] Maimonides, Yad Hachazakah, laws of Kings 3:9
[xxviii] Talmud, Kiddushin 42b