The Torah forbids a Cohen, or
a “priest” (1) to marry a divorcee (2). The explanation of this prohibition
is that the role of the Cohen in worship requires him to be holy.
This law disturbs me. I'm concerned
that something negative is implied about divorced women. The assumption seems to
be that, if a Cohen marries a divorcee, this would detract from his holiness. I
will not “solve” this riddle in this blog. As a Jew, the discussion itself and
questions, in general, have value irrespective of the answers.
I posted a question about this
issue on Facebook. More than 120 comments were posted in response. One Jewish
woman asked why “no responsibility for the breakdown
of a marriage is placed on the man”? And if there was an equivalent law about divorced men? A
Muslim woman agreed. She wrote that “in many cultures ...we have this issue
of the blame being on the woman too and divorce being such a taboo topic...that
people are forced to stay together to not bring shame on the family”.
There are several approaches to
explaining this law, written several centuries ago.
1. Blame: "...a
woman, being divorced, will already show that a matter of disgrace was found in
her, [so] it is not fitting that a Cohen should marry someone who was not
fitting to be a wife [for her first husband], because he [the Cohen] is holy to
his God” (3). The assumption is that “the husband did not divorce
her out of the wickedness of his heart…” (4). So, it must be that
the divorce was in response to a significant moral failure on her part (5).
This 14th and 15th century
approach does not take into account the reality, we all know today, that
divorce is often not the result of a woman’s shortcomings. Although
circumstances were different at that time in terms of male dominance, Judaism
has long recognised other valid grounds for divorce. One example given is “if
she burned his cooking” (6). This trivial example makes the point that the
specifics of the complaints couples have about each other, are unimportant.
According to the Torah, the main reason for divorce is because there is hatred
between the couple (7). Another valid reason given for divorce is if a wife
finds her husband repulsive (8). Abuse and various other failings on the part
of the husband are also grounds for divorce (9). Based on both factual and
textual evidence, the blame approach is problematic.
2.
Blemish: Another approach sees the marriage partner’s
virginity as important for the Cohen. Just as the Torah forbids a Cohen with
physical imperfections to serve in the temple, it seeks “perfection” in his
spouse (10). Needless to say, this approach does not sit well with the modern
reader, including the writer of this blog. Surely, a woman’s worth is
determined by her personal qualities far more than her virginity! And a man’s
“completeness” surely relates more to his own spiritual achievements and
shortcomings than the qualities of “his woman”.
There is also a textual problem
with this approach. The Torah states that only the chief Cohen, the Cohen
Gadol, is forbidden to marry a widow, but places no such requirement on an
ordinary Cohen (11). Jewish law also allows a Cohen to marry a woman who
engaged in sex, despite not being married (12). Clearly, marrying a
virgin is not a precondition to serving as a Cohen.
3. Bedroom thoughts: A
third approach centres on thoughts during sexual intimacy. Jewish tradition
strongly disapproves of a couple being physically intimate with each other
while their thoughts are about other people or sexual partners (13). This
concern is part of a broader insistence of a union of hearts and souls during
intercourse (14). Jewish law recommends that sex is to be “with the desire
of both partners and their joy” (15). Overall, the physical sexual
experience is deemed worthy and positive if there is a corresponding strong and
pure spiritual union.
Concern is expressed that a
divorced woman is at risk of thinking about her past partner during intimacy
with her current partner. This concern does not take into account the degree of
probability that this will occur. (16). This thinking is linked to the law
forbidding the marriage between a divorcee and a Cohen, who is meant to strive
for perfection17).
This explanation might be more
plausible if it applied equally to a divorced male Cohen and his possible
thoughts about a former partner. I also feel uncomfortable with this
explanation because it suggests that only divorced partners have this type of
thought; yet our tradition acknowledges that anyone might have their thoughts
wander during sex to think about someone they “saw on the road” (18).
4.
Perception: For me, a more palatable approach is to locate the
problem not within the divorced woman, but in the assumed perceptions of the
community (19). With this approach, there is concern that people might respect
the Cohen less because his wife has been divorced. A similar explanation is
used for not allowing a Cohen with a physical “blemish” to serve in the temple
(20). In fact, based on the problem being one of perception, a
dispensation is given in the following circumstances: if the community is
familiar with a particular Cohen who is blind in one eye, their familiarity
with this Cohen would permit him to perform the priestly blessings because they
are unlikely to be distracted by his condition (21). If we apply this
“perception” approach here, we eliminate any disparaging implications about
divorcees and explain this law as a practical concession to flawed superficial
human perspectives.
Regardless of the approach one
takes, the burden of all this holiness falls on women rather than men. This
imbalance is partly corrected by the prophet Malachi’s scathing critique (22)
of male Cohanim (plural of Cohen) who opportunistically abandoned their first
wives in favour of the perhaps more exotic, idol-worshipping women they
encountered.
The prophet thunders thus:
“And now, O priests, this charge is for you...The Torah of
truth was in his mouth, And he turned many away from sin… But you have turned
away from that course...And I, in turn, have made you despicable and vile in
the eyes of all the people… and this second thing you have done, You cover the
altar of the Lord with tears, weeping, and moaning... But you ask, “Because of
what?” Because the Lord is a witness between you and the wife of your youth
with whom you have broken faith, though she is your partner and covenanted
spouse...let no one break faith with the wife of his youth. ...For I detest
divorce—said the LORD,...do not act treacherously.
Perhaps more interesting than all
the text is the lived experienced of a modern day Cohen, let’s call him Abe,
who is married to a wonderful woman, who had been divorced prior to their
marriage.
Abe told me that he and his
now-wife “were faced with a moral dilemma: he could continue
to remain unmarried in the new relationship, which would not impact on his
standing as a Cohen; or he could remarry, thereby honouring the relationship
and those closest to them who believed in the sanctity of marriage. If he
proceeded to marry her, Abe faced losing Cohen privileges. He had particularly
enjoyed blessing the community as a Cohen.
After
consultations with various Rabbis, they decided to remarry. Unable to do so
through an Orthodox ceremony, they did so through Reform.
Nevertheless,
Abe has continued to be an active member of the Orthodox Synagogue. Although he
disobeyed the commandment not to marry a divorcee, he feels accepted and
comfortable over there. Looking back, though, he clearly misses not being able
to “bless the people of Israel with love” during the ”Blessing of the Priests”
ceremony. At the same time, he feels grateful for his loving, married
relationship and thriving, blended family.
Abe
does not feel resentful. He accepts that the dignity of the office of the Cohen
needs to be preserved, even though he personally has chosen to prioritise the
dignity of his wife and family.
Abe’s choice is not condoned by the
law. Sadly, he is paying a price for his choice, and I am sure this was not
easy for his wife, either. In the end, I am left with the question: why does it
need to be so?
Notes
1. The word Cohen is often
translated as a priest. A Cohen is a descendant of Aaron, the brother of Moses.
In the times that the temple stood in Jerusalem, they had a key role in
offering sacrifices. Today, the main role of the Cohen is to bless the
community.
2. Leviticus
21:7
3.
Ralbag (1288-1344, France) on Leviticus 21:7, כבר יורה היותה גרושה שנמצא בה דבר גנות ואין ראוי שיקח הכהן לאשה מי שלא היתה ראויה לאשה: כי קדוש הוא לאלהיו. ולזה אין ראוי שיקח אלו הנשים אשר הם בזה האופן מהגנות: See Gittin
90b which would seem to support the Ralbag’s approach.
4. Abarbanel
(1437-1580) on Leviticus 21:7, he creatively suggests that the phrase “he is
holy to his God” can be applied to the ex-husband, who (for some
unexplained reason) is assumed to have been holy and motivated in his decision
to divorce his wife by religious puritanism because of her immoral conduct.
5. This
approach is influenced by the first scenario of divorce given in Deuteronomy
24:1-3. “1. When a man takes a wife and is
intimate with her, and it happens that she does not find favor in his eyes
because he discovers in her an unseemly [moral] matter, and he writes for her a
bill of divorce and places it into her hand, and sends her away from his house,
2. And she leaves his house and goes and marries another man, 3. If the latter
husband hates her and writes her a bill of divorce, and places it into her hand
and sends her away from his house…” See
various opinions and interpretations in the Talmud Gittin
90a and 90b that emphasise the woman being at fault as being the reason for a
divorce.
6. Talmud
Gittin 90a and 90b
7. Beis
Shmuel on Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 119:3, while the language is quite
male-centric, the key principle is that strife between the couple is the
primary factor in consideration whether divorce is appropriate.
9. Maimonides
Yad Hachazakah, Hilchos Ishut, 14:8
10.
Zohar, Raya Mehemna, on Emor, p.89b and 90a, on the verse “and he,
a virgin”.
11.
Leviticus 21:7 and 21:14
12.
Shulchan Aruch Even Ezer 6:8
13.
Talmud Nedarim 20b, midrash Tanchuma Naso 7
15.
Maimonides, Yat Hachazaka, Deot, 5:4
16.
Talmud Pesachim 112a and b, Talmud Moed Katan 23a, Tosafot
starting with Ad.
17.
Radvaz, in Taamei Hamitzvot,
כבר ידעת
כי המחשבה
עיקר גדול
בזיווג ואשה
גרושה דעתה
על אחריםSefer Hachinuch mitzva 272, and 273
18.
Midrash Tanchuma, Naso 7b.
19.
Sefer Hachinuch Mitzva?
20.
Abarbanel on Emor,
21.
Maimonides, Yad Hachazakah, book of Love, Laws of Prayers and
Lifting the Hands 15:2, see Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 128.
22.
Malachi 2
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